A growing number of States have been offering so-called citizenship by investment programs (CBI) or related residence by investment programs (RBI), where they offer residence and/or their nationality to foreigners willing to invest a considerable sum in their economies and/or to donate to their budget or other public funds. We focus on the CBI. Among States that offer specific CBI programs are mainly Caribbean states, but also three EU Member States, namely Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta. The choice of an investment or donation as one of the grounds for the acquisition of the nationality of a (Member) State is in principle a legitimate choice under both international and EU law. In Section 2, we will first offer some thoughts on privileged naturalizations in State interest in general, and specifically about investment migration, before we embark on the discussion of the CBI schemes that are offered in Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta. Section 3 explores the principle of national autonomy and its limitations both in international and EU law, with the focus on the existing CBI programs in the EU and their compatibility with international and EU law. Moreover, we will analyse the approach of the EU institutions towards such schemes.
Introduction
Over the past decades, a growing number of States have been offering so-called citizenship by investment (hereinafter: CBI) programs or related residence by investment programs (hereinafter: RBI), 1 where they afford residence and/or even their nationality to foreigners willing to invest a considerable sum in their economies and/or to donate to their budget or other public funds. In our article we focus on the CBI, even though it must be noted that in many cases both programs are interrelated, as residence of the investor is often the first step to the CBI. Among States that offer specific CBI programs are mainly Caribbean states, 2 but also three EU Member States, namely Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta. The choice of an investment or donation as one of the grounds for the acquisition of the nationality of a (Member) State is in principle a legitimate choice under both international and EU law. It is a manifestation of their national autonomy in matters of nationality that allows them wide discretion in the choice of the relevant links they employ for applicants to acquire their nationality (Tratnik and Weingerl, 2018) .
However, the CBI programs are often considered problematic, not only generally but also due to EU-specific reasons. They are seen as problematic since by definition they are open only to wealthy persons and to those who might have acquired their wealth by criminal activities. Another concern regarding the CBI is fear that such programs might facilitate tax evasion. In the EU, the CBI programs have another important dimension. Since obtaining the nationality of an EU Member State necessarily results in the acquisition of EU citizenship, such acquisition is not merely a concern of the Member State that naturalized the investor, but also of other Member States. The other Member States are under the unconditional obligation to recognize such acquisition 3 and to grant the naturalized persons the rights under EU law, most notably the right to enter and to reside in their territory. Such an obligation is subject to only one exception -the Member States can refuse the recognition of the acquisition of EU citizenship if the Member States' nationality is acquired contrary to international or EU law. to establish the State interest in each particular case, such naturalizations are subject not only to stricter and/or more extensive procedural requirements but also to additional criteria. 8
As set out above, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta are the only EU Member States currently operating CBI schemes. Some other Member States expressly recognize the economic interest as a State interest that provides a basis for a privileged naturalization. 9 Moreover, in several other Member States the criteria for determining what is in the national interest are not well-defined, and the resulting ambiguity affords the competent authorities with considerable discretion that, in principle, also allows for the acquisition of nationality by investment.
The interest of small States in investment migration is obvious. Large amounts of money that applicants must invest or donate to a State in order to be eligible for CBI are a welcome contribution to their economy, as well as to their budget. The main benefit of the acquisition of a new (additional) nationality for the investor is in most cases not the fact that the investor acquires the right to settle down in his/her new national State, but that he/she acquires a passport, which affords visa free travel to a large number of other States. In this vein, the acquisition of the nationality of an EU Member State seems to be of special value. In such a case the investor not only acquires a passport that enables him/her to a visa free travel to a large number of other States, but even more importantly, the investor automatically also acquires the EU citizenship with the right to reside in all other Member States. Also, the possibility of visa free travel to the EU can be a benefit that makes an investment in the nationality of a State that enjoys a visa free regime with the EU compelling. 10 LEXONOMICA P. Weingerl & M. Tratnik: Citizenship by 
Bulgaria
The Bulgarian CBI program was introduced in September 2013 through amendments to both the Foreigners of the Republic of Bulgaria Act (FA) and to the Citizenship Act (CA). After the publication of the Commission's 2019 Report, the Bulgarian government announced that it would abolish the whole program not only because of criticism outlined in the Report but also because it failed to be an economic success due to lack of interest on the part of potential investors. 11 However, amendments to the existing program 12 were published on March 22, 2019 and the CBI program has not yet been abolished. The information about the acquisition of nationality is (still) published on the web pages of the Ministry of Justice. 13
The Bulgarian nationality by investment can be acquired in a two-stage procedure. First, the applicant must acquire a permanent residence permit that is subject to an approved investment consisting of a minimum one million BGN (cca. EUR 512,000. Typically, this investment will be made either in a Bulgarian company or in Bulgarian Government bonds (Article 25(1) FA). The procedure to acquire permanent residency takes four to six months. The investor becomes eligible to apply for Bulgarian citizenship under Article 14a CA after having held a permanent residency card for 12 months and, additionally, making an investment of an additional one million BGN. 14 The applicant is not required to live in Bulgaria prior to or during the application, or even after the naturalization. Furthermore, the applicant is allowed to sell the Bulgarian assets as soon as two years after the formal naturalization. As part of the procedure to obtain a permanent residence permit, Invest Bulgaria Agency is charged by the Bulgarian government with the task of investigating the origin of the applicants' funds. As part of this procedure, the applicant must provide a declaration regarding the origin of the funds in compliance with the anti-money laundering law. In the application for citizenship, the Citizenship Directorate and the Commission verify the validity of both the declaration of the applicant and the background checks carried out by the Invest Bulgaria Agency. 17
Cyprus
Cyprus introduced its CBI program in 2013 in its Civil Registry Law 114(I)/2002, which was amended in 2018 and in 2019. The program is based upon subsection (2 (Kudryashova, 2019: 6) . The Cypriot police prepare a criminal record report on the basis of the information provided by the applicants and a search in both the Europol and Interpol databases. 20
The Cypriot banks' compliance departments must implement due diligence measures to verify and validate the origin of the funds used in the investment. This is based on the bank transfer receipts that must be submitted by all applicants (investor as well as the family members) that the transactions were made through Cypriot banks from a foreign country to the Cypriot bank account of the seller/company/investment fund. There is no requirement for applicants to live in Cyprus prior, during, or after the application process and there are no language requirements, either. Since second nationality is permitted in Cyprus, the investor may keep his/her original nationality. Moreover, the government has committed itself to prepare an Annual Implementation Report detailing the number of passports issued, the nationality of applicants, as well as the sectors receiving investments from such applicants. The program is limited to 700 applications per year. The limits for 2019, as well as for 2020, have already been met in October 2019. 22
There is a specific feature to the Cypriot CBI program that is in variance to those of both Bulgaria and Malta. In Cyprus, while the investor is allowed to sell his/her investment after five years, he/she is compelled to keep his/her residence and the residential property. By moving the residence and/or selling the property he/she faces the revocation of the naturalization. This sanction is problematic from the perspective of EU law. By moving his/her residence to another Member State, the investor is exercising one of the basic rights enjoyed by a EU citizen, namely the right of free movement and residence, guaranteed under Article 21 of the TFEU, as well as under Article 45 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Moreover, the free movement of capital is affected as well (Article 63 TFEU). We can fully agree with Kudryashova (2019: 18-20 ) that this limitation is incompatible not only with the TFEU but also the Charter. Lastly, these sanctions impermissibly infringe upon the principle of proportionality in the light of the cases Rottmann and Tjebbes. 23
Malta
In Spring 2013, Malta launched its Individual Investor Program (IIP) by enacting amendments to Article 10(9)(b) of the Maltese Nationality Act (MNA Commission regarding amendments to the IIP. Under such amendments, in order to acquire Maltese nationality, the donor/investor has to reside in Malta for at least 12 months prior to the naturalisation.
The amended regulation was published on 4 January 2014, by means of Legal Notice (LN) 47 of 2014. Pursuant to the IIP, foreigners and their family members are granted Maltese nationality by naturalization, if they meet certain requirements. Namely, they must pay EUR 650.000 to the National Development and Social Fund; invest at least EUR 150.000 in approved investments that must be held for at least five years; and, they must purchase or rent residential property of a certain value. 25 This property may not be let or sublet and must also be kept for at least five years. Additional fees apply to the family members (Kälin 2019: 194) . The applicant must have had legal residence for one year in Malta prior to the naturalization. However, no physical presence in Malta is required. No language or integration test is needed, either. The total number of successful applications is topped at 1,800 per annum (family members not included).
A special State organ, called the Office of the Regulator IIP, was created in order to monitor the application of the program in practice. Each year the Office publishes statistical data regarding the number and the geographical origin of the applicants, the amounts of money invested, the progress of applications, etc. The names of all persons who acquired the nationality under the IIP are published in the government Gazette (Kälin 2019: 194) .
The applicant must produce a clean criminal record and must undergo a detailed fourtier due diligence screening, regulated in Articles 4(2), 7(2,4) and 8(1) of the LN 2014 that must be paid by the applicant (Kälin 2019: 194) . The program is not open to citizens of Afghanistan, North Korea and Iran; persons with significant ties with those countries; or to persons originating from a country subject to a travel ban (Kälin 2019: 194) . The checks on the criminal background cover the main applicant and his/her dependents over 12 years of age. The background checks are carried out on the basis of police records from the Maltese police and/or from the competent authorities in the applicants' country of origin and in the country or countries of residence where the applicant has resided for more than six months during the last ten years. The Identity Agency Malta, 28 a government agency with a separate legal personality, is required to verify the source of all funds. The main applicant must confirm that his/her wealth has been obtained from completely legitimate sources, and is not, whether directly or indirectly, derived from the proceeds of criminal activities of any kind. 29 The main applicant must also submit administrative documentation and bank statements for the account from which funds for the IIP are being transferred. Funds must be remitted from a personal account registered in the main applicant's name. All information gathered by the Identity Agency Malta must be verified by independent service providers. 30 3 National Autonomy in Matters of Nationality 31
General remarks
The national autonomy in matters of citizenship is not absolute, as it is limited both by rules of international and EU law. Before we embark on an examination of these limitations, it must be noted that the national autonomy in matters of nationality has two aspects: an internal (national) 32 one and an international one. The national aspect refers to the right of States to autonomously lay down the rules on acquisition and loss of nationality in their domestic legal orders (cf. Crawford, 2012: 510 The two aspects of national autonomy can be illustrated by the Nottebohm case, 35 as the International Court of Justice (hereinafter: ICJ) made a clear distinction between the validity of the grant of Liechtenstein nationality to Mr. Nottebohm (corresponding to the internal aspect) and the effects of this grant vis-à-vis Guatemala (corresponding to its international aspect). As to the first issue, the Court fully recognised the principle of national autonomy. 36 Only with respect to the international aspect of Liechtenstein's grant of its nationality to Mr Nottebohm did the Court take the view that a grant of nationality can only be effective as against third States if it is a manifestation of a genuine link between the State and the person in question.
The impact of the Nottebohm decision has been overexaggerated (See also Spiro, 2019; Sarmiento, 2019) . This was a case about diplomatic protection, not a case about citizenship in general. To this end, as Spiro argues, ''genuine link' is not and never was a requirement for international recognition of the attribution of nationality' (Spiro, 2019: 2) . Moreover, it was a case about measures during wartime, i.e. in very specific circumstances, and it was decided more than half a century ago, in times when migrations were not as common as they are today, especially in the EU context. Today, it is not uncommon that a person has a close connection to more than one State. Thus, the concept of genuine link as used in the Nottebohm decision was 33 LNTS Vol. 179, 89. 34 E.g., A State would grant its nationality to all or a considerable part of nationals of another State living on the territory of the latter and without its consent. 35 Nottebohm. See recently about this decision Spiro, 2019 . See also Kälin, 2019: 88-93; Tratnik and Weingerl, 2019. 36 'It is for Liechtenstein, as it is for every sovereign State, to settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality, and to confer that nationality by naturalization granted by its own organs in accordance with that legislation'. ' (Spirom 2019: 14) . By ignoring the fact that Nottebohm possessed only the Liechtenstein nationality, the ICJ put him in the untenable situation of being what might be called a "stateless person". In our opinion, the decision in the Nottebohm case is obsolete, or as Advocate General Tesauro so eloquently put it in the Micheletti case, 37 the decision should be relegated to the 'romantic period of international law' (See also Spiro, 2019; Sarmiento, 2019) .
The International Law Commission (ILC) also expressly rejected the genuine link standard as a legitimate basis for the exercise of diplomatic protection: 'if the genuine link requirement proposed by Nottebohm was strictly applied it would exclude millions of persons from the benefit of diplomatic protection as in today's world of economic globalization and migration there are millions of persons who have moved away from their State of nationality and made their lives in States whose nationality they never acquire or have acquired nationality by birth or descent from States with which they have a tenuous connection.' 38 Pursuant to Article 3 (1) Micheletti did not have a genuine link with Italy. But, the CJEU did not apply a genuine link test and the Nottebohm case was not mentioned. In fact, no important decisions from international tribunals have adopted its rationale. In a jurisprudential sense, Nottebohm was dead on arrival (Spiro, 2019: 12) .
Limitations of national autonomy in international law
In this section, we will further focus on the formal sources of international and EU law, namely international conventions, customary international law, general principles of law and rules of EU law in order to identify the limitations of the national autonomy in the area of nationality.
International law can limit national autonomy in questions of citizenship through both international conventions and international human rights law. When States undertake certain commitments regarding the question of citizenship, they voluntarily accede to the limitations that a convention imposes on their autonomy.
The right to citizenship was proclaimed as a human right in Article 15 (1) International human rights law prohibits the arbitrary (see also Crawford, 2012: 522-523) deprivation of citizenship and is regarded as a limitation of state autonomy in the field of nationality. This prohibition is already governed by Article 15 (2) UDHR. This view has also been confirmed by the UNCHR 'Tunis Conclusions' 2014 that consider it as part of international customary law. It follows from the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality that any loss of nationality must be established by law that is applied in a non-discriminatory way, must serve a legitimate purpose and be proportionate. The procedure leading to the decision on the loss of nationality must comply with requirements of due process of law under international human rights law and the decision must be subject to effective legal remedies (De Groot and Vonk, 2015: 46).
Limitations of national autonomy in EU Law

EU Citizenship being dependent on national citizenship
The citizenship of the EU and the nationality of the Member States are two independent legal concepts, yet they are closely connected. 55 Against this background, it is the Member States that indirectly, through the application of their own citizenship rules, decide about the acquisition and loss of EU citizenship. Consequently, the Member States by their national rules on nationality do not only decide to whom they will grant the rights attached to the nationality in their internal legal systems, but also who will enjoy the rights under EU law, attached to the possession of the EU citizenship. This is a significant difference as compared to national citizenship rules in international law.
The citizenship of the Union was first introduced in the Maastricht Treaty concluded in 1992, 56 though the Treaty was the culmination of a longer process embedded in the history of free movement of workers. By expressly replacing the wording 'complementary nature' of the citizenship of the EU with the wording 'being additional' to national citizenship, Member States stressed that the citizenship of the EU shall not be understood as a concept which is independent of national citizenship. Against this background, the EU citizenship has been seen as 'paradoxical in its nature', since it is constitutionalised in the EU's treaty framework, yet dependent upon the nationality of a Member State 'to provide the gateway' or 'a connecting factor' (Jessurun d'Oliveira, 2018) to membership (Shaw, 2018: 1) . Therefore, it has been referred to also as a 'ius tractum', and thus as a 'derivative status' (Kochenov, 2009: 169 dependency, but also one of legal colonialism, allowing the Court of Justice to engage and supervise yet another field of national law' (Chalmers, Davies and Monti, 2016 : 474, referring to Davies and Rostek, 2006 , and Kochenov, 2010 .
In essence, the catalogue of rather limited rights tied to the EU citizenship comprises two sets of rights: the free movement rights and political rights of EU citizens. The list of rights found in TFEU confirms an older trend in the EU citizenship or part of the pre-history of the EU citizenship: its market citizenship legacy (Coutts, 2019) .
Thus, it has been mostly ascribed to mobile EU citizens. The impact of EU citizenship on nationals of the Member States who have not exercised their free movement rights is to a great extent still unclear (see also Shaw, 2011: 576) . The Court expressly recognized in Grzelczyk that the basis or essence of Union citizenship in law has been an equal treatment law or the non-discriminatory approach. Thereby, it enabled 'those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for'. 62
As aforementioned, the Member States were very reluctant to confer to the EU institutions any part of their sovereign rights concerning nationality. Consequently, no competences in the area of citizenship have been transferred to the EU in the Treaties and there is no competence to produce any secondary legislation in this area. Therefore, at least on the level of the primary and secondary legislation, EU law does not encroach upon the national autonomy of the Member States because of the lack of competence, unless, as argued by Sarmiento, 'objective difficulties arise and are properly argued by the EU to take measures by way of Article 352 TFEU' (Sarmiento, 2019: 3) . 63 Yet, it might have been desirable to adopt at least some common minimum standards for the acquisition and loss of the Member States nationalities at the EU level in order to ensure that some minimum guarantees are observed in safeguarding equal treatment in all other Member States (Tratnik, 2018: 98-99) . 64 It is true that the acquisition of national citizenship is not entirely autonomous, as the Member States need to lay down rules subject to due regard to EU. This requirement comprises not only the observance of the principle of sincere forfeited his Austrian citizenship. 69 One year later, the naturalization was withdrawn, due to the fact that Rottmann had failed to disclose that criminal proceedings were pending against him in Austria. Rottmann appealed against the withdrawal, contending the decision would render him stateless, and that meanwhile the criminal proceedings in Austria would make it extremely difficult for him to regain his Austrian citizenship. 70 The CJEU had to answer the question whether Rottmann's loss of his German citizenship, which would in turn cause him to be stateless, was contrary in general to EU law and in particular to the rules pertaining to EU citizenship. The views both of the German and Austrian Governments, as well as of the European Commission, were that Rottmann's case fell outside of the scope of EU law because it was a purely internal situation between the German State and its citizen. The Court, however, dismissed this argument, stating:
' Under Article 16(1)(d) DNA, the Dutch nationality is also lost by minors whose father or mother lost his/her nationality under Article 15(1)(c). 77 The ten year period can be interrupted by the issuance of a declaration regarding the possession of Dutch nationality, a travel document or a Dutch identity card. In such cases, a new ten year period starts to run from the day of issuance of the declaration, document or card. 78 This exception is only available to adults.
The described provisions are a clear manifestation of the general prohibition of dual (or multiple) nationality in Dutch nationality law and have been severely criticised in the legal scholarship (Kochenov, 2019; Jessurun d'Oliveira, 2016: 248-255 Groot, 1998: 103-106; De Groot, 1999: 20. 77 As to minors certain exceptions, provided for in Article 16 (2) AG Mengozzi found that Article 15 is compatible with EU law not only because the concerned person has several options to interrupt the ten year period 80 but also because for former Dutch citizens it is relatively easy to regain their nationality by taking residence in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, under Article 6(1)(f). 81 As to minors, the AG found that they should have the same right to block the loss of their nationality as their parents. Therefore, he concluded there was no compatibility of Article 16(1)(d) and (2) DNA with Article 20 TFEU and Article 24 of the Charter. 82
The Court departed partially from the Opinion of the AG. Since the applicants did not exercise their free movement rights within the EU, the Court noted at the outset that there was no need to answer the question with regard to Article 21 TFEU. 83 Answering the question for preliminary ruling, the Court ruled:
'Article 20 TFEU, read in the light of Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides under certain conditions for the loss, by operation of law, of the nationality of that Member State, which entails, in the case of persons who are not also nationals of another Member State, the loss of their citizenship of the Union and the rights attaching thereto, in so far as the competent national authorities, including national courts where appropriate, are in a position to examine, as an ancillary issue, the consequences of the loss of that nationality and, where appropriate, to have the persons concerned recover their nationality ex tunc in the context of an application by those persons for a travel document or any other document showing their nationality. In the context of that examination, the authorities and the courts must determine whether the loss of the nationality of the Member State concerned, when it entails the loss of citizenship of the Union and the rights attaching thereto, has due regard to the principle of proportionality so far as concerns the consequences of that loss for the situation of each person concerned and, if relevant, for that of the members of their family, from the point of view of EU law.' It is obvious that the most important safeguards that ensure that a Member State's rules on the loss of nationality by the operation of the law remain compatible with EU law is the possibility for the State to make an individual assessment of the applicant's request and, where appropriate, to permit the recovery of the nationality ex tunc. Regarding the individual assessment, the loss of nationality must be consistent not only with the right to family life (Article 7 of the Charter) but also with the obligation to take into consideration the best interests of the child (Article 24). 84 The individual circumstances to be considered are possible limitations on the exercise of the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, in particular difficulties in continuing to travel to the Netherlands or to another Member State in order to retain genuine and regular links with family members, to pursue professional activities or to undertake the necessary steps to pursue such activities.
Other relevant factors include whether the person concerned might not have been able to renounce the nationality of a non-EU country, 85 and whether there is a 'serious risk, that his or her safety or freedom to come and go would substantially deteriorate because of the impossibility for that person to enjoy consular protection under Article 20(2)(c) TFEU in the territory of the third country in which that person resides '. 86 With respect to minors, the administrative and judicial authorities must take into account the possibility that loss of nationality 'fails to meet the child's best interests as enshrined in Article 24 of the Charter because of the consequences of that loss for the minor from the point of view of EU law.' 87
In addition to the proportionality principle, other principles of EU law could also be infringed either by rules on the acquisition and loss of nationality of a Member State or by the application of the national rules. to be disproportionate if it infringes one of them' (Cambien, 2012: 15) . See also Van der Brink, 2019: 21-36 In what follows, we examine the approach of the EU institutions towards citizenship by investment schemes.
The Approach of the EU Institutions towards CBI
It follows from the foregoing that the acquisition and loss of a Member State citizenship falls in the Member States' competence, though they need to exercise it 'with due regard to Union law'. 90 Accordingly, in the Rottmann case the Commission claimed that the question of loss of nationality of a Member State fell outside of the scope of EU law because it was a purely internal situation between Germany and its citizen. However, almost two decades later the Commission has changed its approach towards the principle of State autonomy in matters of citizenship, as can be seen in the citizenship by investment context, in particular regarding the Maltese citizenship by investment scheme. 91 88 Costello argues that Article 4(3) TEU 'incorporates the type of good faith considerations that under public international law may be covered under the abuse of rights doctrine'. Costello, 2011: 323. 89 Cf. Tratnik and Weingerl, 2019. 91 For an extensive discussion of this issue, see Kälin, 2019: 136-143 and 190-195; Carrera Nuñez, 2015: 293-326; Marrero González, 2015 : 171-173. Cf. Kochenov, 2018 Kudryashova, 2019: 14. The Commission has not been the only EU institution condemning CBI programs. The European Parliament also severely criticised the Maltese program in the resolution adopted in January 2014. In its resolution, the European Parliament called upon Malta to bring its citizenship scheme into line with the EU's values. 97 Although matters of residency and citizenship are the competence of the Member States, the European Parliament called on the Member States 'to be careful when exercising their competences in this area and to take possible side-effects into account'. 98 The Parliament emphasised that granting CBI 'undermines the mutual trust upon which the Union is built'. Moreover, it 'undermines the very concept of European citizenship'.
The Commission claims in its 2019 Report that the principle of sincere cooperation could be infringed if a Member State awarded nationality 'absent any genuine link to the country or its citizens'. 99 We cannot share the view of the Commission. Firstly, citizenship by investment schemes are by nature normally operated on a small scale. 100 Secondly, as described above, several other Member States apart from Cyprus, Malta and Bulgaria provide for privileged naturalisation in the 'national interest.' For instance, these might be persons that for specific economic or noneconomic reasons are of importance to the naturalising Member State. Thirdly, since the main legal argument against citizenship by investment schemes is that privileged naturalisation is offered to persons with no or very weak connections with the naturalising Member State, it should be stressed again that a genuine link is not a requirement for the attribution of nationality under international or EU law. Moreover, there are other grounds for naturalisation of persons lacking a 'genuine link' that have raised no concern thus far. For example, several Member States provide for the acquisition of nationality iure sanguinis if one of the parents is a national of that Member State, even by birth abroad. 101 In cases of emigrants overseas, the nationality of a Member State may pass to their grandchildren or even In this context, the anxiety of some European political institutions regarding citizenship by investment seems to be an attempt to regulate national rules on the acquisition of citizenship despite both a lack of competence to do so and a lack of a legitimate aim. In its 2019 Report, the Commission omitted any references not only to the principle of State autonomy in matters of citizenship under international law but also to the question of competences in nationality matters in the EU. At the same time, the Commission relied heavily on the genuine link criterion which, as we have seen, the CJEU has not applied in its case law. Furthermore, this criterion has also been rejected in the context of international law. In short, the Commission constructed a narrative which is not underpinned by valid legal arguments. This narrative is then used to justify the Commission's encroachment into matters not in the competence of the EU, and in so doing, to selectively attack certain national rules on investment migration schemes. By employing the genuine link rhetoric, the Commission seeks to depict these schemes as an example of a grave violation of EU law. Moreover, the European Parliament's reliance on mutual trust is an attempt to further (self-)curtail the State autonomy in this field, although (paradoxically) the lack of trust in the governance of questions of nationality at the EU level was the 102 
Conclusions
It follows from the foregoing that States enjoy considerable autonomy in regulating the acquisition and loss of their citizenship under international law, which is easy to explain. Firstly, these rules strike at the very core of State sovereignty. Secondly, States attach to their citizenship certain rights and duties in their internal legal systems. It is more than logical that States should be allowed to exercise the utmost freedom in deciding to whom to confer or withhold those rights, as long as their rules do not violate human rights. Consequently, states must draft their rules on the acquisition of nationality without discrimination and in such a way that statelessness does not occur. Citizenship may not be deprived arbitrarily, even if it does not result in statelessness. Consequently, the limitations of state autonomy require inclusive rules on citizenship, mainly when the issue of statelessness or discrimination is in question. However, these limitations do not impose restraints on States concerning the possible grounds for the attribution of citizenship.
Other States may only refuse to recognise a nationality acquired from a third State if it is acquired in violation of international law. With the exception of a few very specific cases, there is no relevant case law to demonstrate examples where the acquisition of nationality would be in violation of international law. Contrary to what some authors and the Commission would mistakenly contend, the genuine link criterion in Nottebohm was only applied to the recognition of Liechtenstein nationality for the purpose of diplomatic protection. The ruling of the ICJ was so case specific that it already for this reason cannot be extrapolated for use in broader context. As to attribution, the ICJ expressly recognised the right of Liechtenstein to naturalise Mr. Nottebohm or any other person by its own nationality rules. We conclude from the foregoing that international law does not affect the power of Member States of the EU to adopt citizenship by investment programs and at the same time requires other Member States to recognise the nationality acquired through such programs. In the EU the individual Member States do not only decide to whom they will grant the rights attached to nationality in their internal legal systems, but even more importantly, they decide to whom the other Member States will have to grant rights provided for in EU law. These specific circumstances have consequences for the Member States granting their nationality, as well as for Member States hosting EU citizens from other Member States. The former enjoy in principle their national autonomy in granting their nationality, but they must exercise it with due regard to Union law, as has been underlined by the CJEU. Since the 'receiving' Member States are obliged to grant EU citizens rights under EU law, they cannot unilaterally decide which nationality to recognise where multiple nationalities are available. They also may not rely on a genuine link test or the idea of prevailing or effective nationality.
The Member States' autonomy in matters of citizenship is subject to additional limitations compared to international law. The Member States must observe general principles of EU law, most notably the principle of proportionality. As Rottmann, Kaur and Tjebbes have demonstrated, this principle plays an important role only in cases of loss of nationality. Yet, the role of EU law and of the CJEU is very limited. Rottmann, and even much more evidently Tjebbes, have shown that even when required to apply the proportionality test, the Member States enjoy a very large degree of autonomy in choosing the grounds for the loss of their nationalities. As to the compatibility of the modes of acquisition of nationality under the three-described CBI programs, it may be concluded that they are not affected by EU-specific limitations of the national autonomy. The principle of proportionality, which is the only limitation that has already been confirmed by the CJEU, has been applied only in cases of loss of the Member State and EU citizenship. The described CBI programs are also not affected by the principle of sincere cooperation. However, the rules on the loss of the Cypriot nationality by investment are incompatible with the rules on the free movement of the capital, the right of free movement and residence, as well as with the principle of proportionality.
